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Abstract 
In recent years, various "unconventional" views have been advanced that promise to offer 
new analytical insights and policy approaches that are suited to control the value of money, 
particularly in a constellation of low growth and unemployment. Whereas Forward Guidance 
attempts to decrease the real interest rate by low nominal rates and by creating excessive in-
flationary expectations, the Neo-Fisherian approach suggests to increase nominal rates 
immediately to the long-run equilibrium value that corresponds to the inflation target. The 
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level believes that goods prices jump to a level that validates the 
long-run sustainability condition of government debt. All three views are criticized for 
analytical and empirical reasons.  
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I.  Introduction 
Old and modern theories of monetary policy, and also the norm of central bank independence, 
are built on the belief that central banks are able to control inflation. The successful practice 
of bringing down inflation from double-digit figures since the 1970s justifies this old view, al-
ready established by the Quantity Theory of Money − whether central banks use money sup-
ply as an active tool or not.  
However, monetary policy in some advanced countries seems to have difficulties to raise 
inflation from a level that does not conform to the conventional 2% target. Many central 
banks have engaged in what they call "unconventional" policies since the late 2000s. The 
ECB responded to the malaise by choosing "more of the same", i.e. by enlarging its QE pro-
grams. Instruments and supposed channels of transmissions however are hardly different from 
conventional policies, as described in old textbooks: open-market policies, albeit more ag-
gressive than formerly known, and complemented by "qualitative" features. Modern macro 
theory had excluded these policies from its suggested toolset because interest setting appeared 
to be sufficient and more efficient than balance sheet operations.  
 Some new considerations have also been proposed in recent years which have more di-
rect analytical relations to the modern theoretical apparatus of New Keynesian Macroeconom-
ics (NKM). Economists recommend alternative tools to be applied in order to reach the old 
and new target of monetary policy: determining the rate of inflation, now in a somewhat un-
usual direction compared to the former task of stabilisation policy. Included in the list of pos-
sible strategies we find Forward Guidance (FG), the New-Fisherian view (NF) and an appli-
cation of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL); the latter of course might be assigned 
to fiscal policy in the first place, but the alleged transmission mechanism nicely corresponds 
to the way of thinking in modern monetary theory so that it will also be treated here. The pro-
gram of this paper is to discuss whether these new views offer convincing insights. In all three 
cases the answer will be negative. Finally, it is argued that these unconventional approaches 
to inflation control are not needed anyway − there is no "puzzle of missing inflation", and 
central banks should steer their course "back to normal".  
 
II.  Forward Guidance and Raising the Inflation Target 
Announcing the direction of future interest setting on the part of central banks has been a 
rather standard element of monetary policies already in the past. This quite easily can be ex-
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plained by the forward-looking character of policy making which includes prospects of the fu-
ture path of target variables, in most cases the rate of inflation, and the corresponding em-
ployment of suitable instrument choices. From this point of view, FG may simply be defined 
as the practice to communicate prospective steps of the central bank decision making process, 
which however in no way constrains the flexibility to react to new data or insights. "FG 
rightly does not implicate an unconditioned fixation of the monetary policy course. It is a pre-
diction of this course based on the ECB's Two-Pillar Strategy" (Sachverständigenrat 2017: 
para. 365, my translation).  
But there is also a second interpretation of FG which points to a particular twist of central 
bank strategy, namely to announce an overshooting of inflation in relation to the target for a 
considerable time period. The reason for resorting to this kind of strategy is the aim to let the 
economy recover from a deep-seated crisis, so that a particularly low real rate of interest is 
warranted. The credible announcement of keeping the central bank's policy rate below the 
Taylor rate that corresponds to the primary inflation target π ∗ , even when a constellation of 
macro equilibrium, full employment and π π ∗=  is reached, is supposed to push inflationary 
expectations beyond the target rate.  
 This type of FG strategy is encumbered with a series of problems. To begin with, it re-
quires some control over long nominal interest rates as well, because otherwise a successful 
increase of expected inflation might drive up bond rates via the Fisher effect, and the aim of 
lowering the real interest rate cannot be reached. In this context, the ECB holds the opinion 
that term premia will be lowered1, but it is unconvincing to ignore the inflation risk factor. 
Thus in practice, central banks ought to peg the term structure in order to reap the full benefits 
of FG.  
 The literature is more concerned with an alleged time inconsistency problem (Illing 
2015). Assume that the policy works and the macro equilibrium with π π ∗=  is reached much 
earlier, thanks to the extraordinary decrease of the real interest rate. In that situation, which 
                                                 
1 "The aim of forward guidance may be to introduce greater monetary policy accommodation when 
the policy rate reaches the interest rate lower bound and cannot be reduced further, by providing as-
surance that the central bank intends to keep the policy rate low for some time, and for a longer period 
than the public initially expected. The information provided by the central bank that the policy rate is 
very unlikely to be raised for some time influences investors' expectations regarding future short-term 
rates and, through that channel, puts downward pressure on longer-term interest rates. In fact, it con-
tributes to extracting duration risk from the market by reassuring investors that the interest rate risk 
implicit in holding long-dated fixed-income securities is reduced. This awareness encourages portfolio 
shifts into longer maturity assets and a compression of long-term yields" (ECB 2014: 67).  
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conforms to an optimum with regard to the original policy loss function, the central bank 
clearly has an incentive immediately to stop the low-policy-rate course and return to standard 
Taylor interest rate setting. Anticipating such a "cheating" behaviour, the public will distrust 
any announcement pointing to inflation overshooting; thus inflationary expectations will re-
main in the realm of π ∗ , the warranted depression of the real interest rate fails and the econ-
omy is stuck in stagnation. This type of time inconsistency problem might be particularly se-
vere in a country that is renowned for its stability-oriented monetary policy in the past.  
A more fundamental question is whether market agents place too much confidence in 
policy announcements at all, irrespective of their intentions. This question leads to the core of 
the FG strategy, and to the FG puzzle which arises from the finding that the communication 
effect in theory is implausibly large, compared to what could perhaps be observed in reality 
(Figure 1). Using the framework of a standard New Keynesian macro model, it can formally 
be demonstrated that the number of periods in which the central bank policy rate is below its 
ordinary Taylor level, has a cumulative positive effect on output and inflation. The transmis-
sion mechanism is given by rational expectations; this includes the assumption that people are 
able to use the model and calculate the macro impact of future interest rate policy (Gertler 
2017).  
  
 
Figure 1: Forward Guidance under rational expectations (Gertler 2017) 
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It is noteworthy that a comparable effect to FG, in theory, can be realised by changing the 
inflation target, which also has been suggested recently as a means to strengthen economic re-
covery and to establish a higher level of nominal interest rates that gives a larger "safety belt" 
in case of adverse demand shocks (Ball 2014). With FG, the public is supposed to believe in a 
temporary higher target, whereas the announcement of a new target in general holds until it 
might be reset in the future. Another difference is that a temporary deviation from the Taylor 
policy interest rate is highlighted with FG, whereas a reset of the inflation target leaves the 
implicit path of policy rates in the background. But of course, inflation targets and policy in-
terest rates are connected through the macro model. Therefore they share the same strength 
and weakness as strategic tools.  
The key weakness of FG is the assumption of rational expectations coupled with a gener-
ally shared belief that monetary policy is technically able to control the rate of inflation. In 
fact, it seems awkward in a sticky zero-inflation constellation to propose a 4% target when the 
central bank obviously and steadfastly fails to reach its traditional 2% target. Gertler (2017: 3) 
concludes that "individuals need direct evidence that the central bank is capable of moving in-
flation to target" − but in this case, a macroeconomic control problem that needs to be solved 
by FG does not exist. In a model with hybrid beliefs, compiled by rational and adaptive ex-
pectations where the latter respond to forecast errors, he finds a much weaker effect of FG.  
An assessment of FG as a monetary policy strategy aiming to control inflation, on the one 
hand, should acknowledge the endeavour of central banks to enhance the transparency of their 
prospective policy course. On the other hand, just communicating intentions will not convince 
market agents that monetary authorities actually are willing and able to achieve a new course 
of macroeconomic variables. Overshooting inflation expectations, which might serve to con-
firm a successful FG strategy, cannot be found in the data (see below). People rely on experi-
ence when building their expectations. It is the crucial drawback of modern macro theory 
since Lucas that adaptive expectations are regarded as a kind of scientific error that is to be 
avoided at any costs when it comes to model building. This will become evident also in the 
next example.  
 
III.  The Neo-Fisherian View 
III.1.  Turning Arbitrage Upside Down: NKM as Bubble Economics 
The NF view differs crucially in its policy recommendation from FG: interest rates should not 
be kept "low for longer" but rather immediately be increased to the level implied by the infla-
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tion target. In order to grasp the scientific background of the proposal, it is useful firstly to 
take a look at a controversy on the dynamic structure of modern macro theory. The standard 
NK model [1] consists of a supply function, a demand function and an interest rate rule, 
where tE  is the expectation operator.  
 ( )
( )
1
1 1
s
t t t t t
d
t t t t t t t
t t t y t
E y
y E y i E r
i r yπ
π β π α ε
σ π ε
π τ π π τ
+
∗+ +
∗ ∗
= + +
= − − − +
= + + − +
 [1] 
In a more compact vector-matrix notation this can be written as  
 1t t t tE π ∗+= + +v A v b Cs  [2] 
where tv  ( 1t tE +v ) denotes the vector of (next period's expected) inflation tπ  and output gap 
ty ; ts  is the vector of white-noise supply and demand shocks, stε  and dtε , respectively. All 
model parameters (defined as non-negative) are captured by the matrices A and C, and the 
vector b; α  denotes the slope of the supply function, depending on market structure and price 
setting conventions; σ  expresses the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, taken from 
households' optimisation calculus. The short-term nominal interest rate ti  is set by the central 
bank; the equilibrium real interest rate r∗  drops from the equations. Ignoring shocks, the so-
lution2 can be calculated as  
 ( ) 1 if 1
0
t
t
ty
π ππ β
∗
− ∗ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥= = − = →⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
v I A b  [3] 
Dynamic stability requires both eigenvalues of matrix A to be smaller than unity. With regard 
to the reaction coefficients πτ  and yτ , this implies that the Taylor Principle holds: 
 1 0yπ
βτ τα
−+ >  [4] 
If the variables of a dynamic system [2] are not pre-determined but depend on expectational 
leads only, besides the fundamental solution [3], there is formally always a bubble solution 
showing an explosive path of endogenous variables. Solving [2] for 1 1 1t t t tE+ + += −v v e , where 
1t+e  indicates expectational errors, and transposing backwards for one period, yields a differ-
                                                 
2 I denotes the unity matrix. With the discount factor 1β < , the solution deviates slightly from the 
ordinary equilibrium value 0ty = , which is implied by the money neutrality proposition (Woodford 
2003: 246). 
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ential equation, the dynamics of which are determined by past values.   
 1 1 11 1t t t tπ− − ∗ −− −= − − −v A v A b e A Cs  [5] 
The value 1t tE +v , built from [5], satisfies equation [2]. The process [5] therefore represents a 
formal solution of [2]; but it is explosive, contrary to [3]. The eigenvalues of 1−A  are not both 
smaller than unity, just because the Taylor coefficients are positive. From this, Cochrane 
(2011) concludes that hyperinflation and deflation cannot be excluded in case of Taylor inter-
est rate policies; the emphasis given to the fundamental equilibrium solution [3] is but a con-
vention, warranted for economic policy reasons.  
 It should be stressed that the foregoing argument represents a minority view in modern 
macro theory. A key objection is that the system of equations cannot simply be "inverted", so 
that [5] ensues, because economic causality in NKM states that inflation and output are de-
termined by their expectational leads, but not by an extrapolation of their past values. Equa-
tion [5] thus suggest the wrong logic of market behaviour (Woodford 2003: 128). Cochrane 
(2011: 582) however sticks to a pure mathematical view when he states that "the equations of 
the model do not specify a causal ordering".3 
 Lending support to Cochrane's view requires the assumption that market expectations fol-
low the process, described in [5], and derive a further increase of inflation from its increase in 
the past. If however the central bank exerts constraints on output and inflation through higher 
real interest rates in that case, rational expectations will be anchored on equilibrium values, 
captured in [3]. Hence, in a scenario of sticky prices, which is the standard assumption in 
NKM where monetary policy has some control over the real market interest rate, Cochrane's 
argument should be rejected (McCallum 2009).  
 Circumstances might be different however if markets are characterised by perfect price 
flexibility. With the parameter α  approaching infinity, output equals its equilibrium level, i.e.  
0ty = , and the supply function drops from the NKM system [1]. The consolidation of the 
demand function (simplified by omitting shocks) 
 ( )10 t t ti E rσ π ∗+= − − −  [6] 
and the interest rule (where the response to the output gap is ignored)  
                                                 
3 Cochrane's reluctance to follow the ordinary understanding of the NKM equation can perhaps be 
explained by his scientific background as a financial market economist: the formal structure of the 
NKM model resembles the well known asset valuation equation, which also is purely forward looking, 
and might switch to bubble paths in case of severe market shocks.  
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 ( )t t ti r ππ τ π π∗ ∗= + + −  [7] 
yields, after eliminating the nominal interest rate, the relation  
 1
1
1 1t t t
E π
π π
τπ π πτ τ
∗+= ++ +  [8] 
This is a purely forward looking equation, with the fundamental solution  
 tπ π ∗=  [9] 
which is convergent because of 1 (1 ) 1πτ+ < .  
 But again, as in [5], there is a hypothetical bubble path corresponding to [8] where 
t t t tEω π π= −  shows the expectation error:  
 ( ) 11t t tπ ππ τ π τ π ω∗−= + − −  [10] 
Here inflation is a diverging process on account of 1 1πτ+ > . For Cochrane, this is a realistic 
threat. He interprets the modified demand equation [6] as a permanently satisfied condition of 
Fisher's Nominal Interest Theorem, whereby the market real rate of interest then no longer 
performs as a macroeconomic control variable.  
 But this interpretation is questionable. In Fisher's theory, the nominal interest rate is an 
endogenous variable, determined by the real rate and expected inflation; but in [7] it is fixed 
by the central bank responding to the inflation gap. Hence, equation [6] can only hold if ex-
pected inflation adjusts to the policy interest rate, i.e. 1t t tE iπ +Δ = Δ . This is the core of Coch-
rane's message (2016: 2): "In a frictionless model, the real interest rate tr  is unrelated to 
monetary policy and inflation. So, if the Fed sets the nominal rate ti , expected inflation must 
follow." Fisher's arbitrage theorem is turned on its head. If this scientific twist is accepted, 
everything else seems to follow inevitably: as the interest rule prescribes (1 )t ti πτ πΔ = + Δ , 
any shock would trigger cumulative inflation driven by Taylor-oriented central bank policies 
− indeed a paradox result.  
 Of course, this scientific twist can and should be disputed. At first glance, just like the 
policy rate ti , inflation expectation 1t tE π +Δ  in [6] is an exogenous term: we cannot force 
market agents to hold a particular expectation, just in order to keep some model's equation in 
balance. In formal terms, [6] simply is over-determined and cannot describe any market be-
haviour. Still it is an open issue how a value for 1t tE π +Δ  will be found in the market sphere. 
If the central bank is unable to control the real interest rate, agents likewise cannot assume 
that inflation is driven by monetary policy. If persistent shocks are excluded, one might say 
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that inflation is indeterminate. But this is exactly what lends support to the establishment of 
the fundamental solution tπ π ∗= , as a kind of conventional or sunspot equilibrium.  
 To summarise, it is surely innovative to describe the NK model as a bubble-prone system, 
but the scientific practice simply to invert the causal ordering of macroeconomic equations is 
hardly convincing. Moreover, the assumption necessary to lend at least some integrity to the 
bubble view, perfect price flexibility, is far beyond any empirical backing. Nevertheless, the 
preceding discussion serves to give a useful background for a minority approach in monetary 
policy debates that urges central banks to raise policy rates in order to achieve an escape from 
a low-inflation, low-employment macroeconomic scenario: here, nominal interest rates are 
regarded as determinants, rather than being determined by, inflation expectations.  
 
III.2.  Raising Inflation Through Higher Interest Rates? 
Cochrane (2016) and his adherents assume the Fisher Equation to be a stable long-term rela-
tionship that has a strong bearing on market agents' beliefs and behaviour. According to that 
view, a central bank that sticks to a zero-interest-rate policy, aiming to trigger a macroeco-
nomic expansion, unintentionally contributes to the persistence of stagnation; agents are sup-
posed to deduce from low a low policy interest rate via the Fisher Equation that the true infla-
tion target also is low. Choosing a policy rate level according to ti r π∗ ∗= + , on the contrary, 
would help to anchor inflation expectations at the old target level, i.e. 1t tE π π ∗+ = , and thus 
preclude slipping off into deflation.  
 The latter recommendation of course contradicts the standard wisdom of stabilisation pol-
icy where rising interest rates at least in the short run lead to a macroeconomic contraction. 
Market agents in general will side with this view, although they will also believe that in the 
long run the Fisher Equation holds. Thus there is a puzzle which might be resolved: do people 
consider interest rate increases to be of short-run or long-run duration?4 
 In spite of sketchy empirical evidence in favour of this two-sided finding, some crucial 
issues come up: Do people really think in terms of long-term macroeconomic laws? Do they 
                                                 
4 "Nominal interest-rate increases that are expected to be temporary, lead, in accordance with con-
ventional wisdom, to a temporary increase in real rates that is contractionary and deflationary. By con-
trast, nominal interest-rate increases that are perceived to be permanent cause a temporary decline in 
real rates with inflation adjusting faster than the nominal interest rate to a higher permanent level. [...] 
Credible announcement of a gradual return of nominal rates to normal levels can bring about a swift 
convergence of inflation to its target level without negative consequences for aggregate activity" 
(Uribe 2017).  
9 
believe in the ability of central banks to steer the economy according to their targets, so that 
market expectations adjust perfectly to communicated changes in the realm of policy aims 
and tools? Critics regard macroeconomic analyses with perfect-foresight equilibria less useful 
for practical purposes. Among others, García-Schmidt and Woodford (2015) retreat also from 
the rational expectations principle which has been an apparently indispensable cornerstone of 
macro theory since the 1980s. They propose the analytical tool of "temporary reflection equi-
libria" representing a permanent learning process of market agents. As already mentioned in 
the debate on FG, this return to an advanced version of the adaptive-expectations view rules 
out that simply communicating new policy target values or new durations of policy instru-
ment operations will help to overcome a low-inflation stagnation.  
 A model-based analysis of the NF promise is a difficult task. The macroeconomic con-
stellation of countries that are in need of unconventional stimulus is best to be described as 
"below equilibrium"; modern macro theories however start their considerations and simula-
tions from equilibrium, as a rule. With that proviso, one might have a look at the conse-
quences of a change of the inflation target in a standard NK model where the implicit assump-
tion is that the economy is in a low-inflation equilibrium at tπ π ∗= ; the central bank an-
nounces a higher rate for a variable length of time. The model simulation explores how the 
path of the nominal policy interest rate has to be designed.5  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1
1
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s
t t t t t t
d
t t t t t t t t
t t t t y t
E y
y E y y i E r
i r yπ
π β θ π θ π α ε
θ θ σ π ε
π τ π π τ
+ −
∗+ − +
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= − + − − − +
= + + − +
 [11] 
For that purpose, the model presented above is enriched in order to capture the effects of dif-
ferent market structures and market behaviour. A variable dose of persistence 0 1θ< <  has 
been incorporated in the supply and demand functions, a modification that finds justification 
in various analytical arguments and empirical findings. The inflation target now follows an 
AR(1) process  
 1t t tπ ϕπ δ∗ ∗−= +  [12] 
where tδ  indicates a one-time deviation that persists depending on 1ϕ ≤ .  
The simulation shows the expansionary result of a target innovation tδ  that necessarily 
                                                 
5 For similar exercises see Hagedorn (2011), Amano et al. (2016), Gabaix (2016), Gerke/Hau-
zenberger (2017) and particularly Garín et al. (2016).  
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forces an adjustment of the nominal interest rate path (Figure 2). An arbitrary, middle-of-the-
road choice of parameters confirms the traditional finding that a lowering of the rate is re-
quired to stimulate the economy − this contradicts the NF view where nominal rates should be 
raised right from the start. Of course, the results depend on chosen parameters. In accordance 
with what has been found in the literature, a flat supply curve (low α ), a large weight given 
to output persistence and adaptive expectations (high θ ), a weak response to the output gap 
(low yτ ), and a high probability of returning to the old inflation target (low ϕ ) contribute to 
counter the NF proposal (Figure 3). Conversely, these results support the current practice of 
central banks to keep interest rates low.6  
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Figure 2: Model simulation (deviations from steady state) after temporary change of inflation target. 
Parameter values were chosen as 0.1α = , 0.99β = , 1σ = , 0.5yπτ τ θ ϕ= = = = . 
 
Taking stock, the proposal urging central banks to raise interest rates to a level that conforms 
to the Fisher Equation and the warranted inflation target tπ π∗ >  seems to assume that people 
build their expectations by looking at long-run equilibrium conditions in economic theory. 
There is little empirical support for such a view. Even if agents agree that a higher level of in-
flation will also lead to a corresponding nominal interest rate, they will hesitate to believe that 
                                                 
6 The probably deleterious consequences of persistent low interest rates for allocative efficiency 
and dynamic stability of asset markets are beyond the focus of the current paper.  
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higher interest rates will bring about higher inflation. Again, it is a case of attaching a false 
causation to an arbitrage relationship.  
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Figure 3: Nominal interest rate path with parameter values different from Figure 2 
 
 
IV.  Misreading Intertemporal Equilibrium Conditions:  
The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level7 
At a first glance, FTPL seems to drop from the list of modern views on central bank policies 
as it apparently deals with fiscal policy. But there are two arguments that might justify its in-
clusion in the program of this paper. First, economists like Cochrane (2016) who deny that 
Taylor interest rate policies can determine inflation (Section III.1) resort to FTPL when they 
are asked how to explain the value of money. Second, it will be shown that the FTPL argu-
                                                 
7 This Section draws on a chapter in Spahn (2017).  
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ment implicitly depends on the assumption that some monetary authority pegs the face value 
of government bonds; therefore the approach has a close link to monetary policy.  
 Contrary to the Quantity Theory of Money, FTPL derives the level of prices from the 
state of public finance, i.e. from a condition of intertemporal sustainability of government 
debt.8 Here, the real value of nominal current debt tB  should be equal to the discounted sum 
of all future real budget surpluses tX .  
 ( )1 1
t jt
j
jt t j
XB
P r
∞ +
= +
=
+∑  [13] 
The equation follows from a standard intertemporal optimisation approach where the trans-
versality condition states that "at the end" of its economic life no agent is allowed to have a 
net-debtor status. If the time perspective is infinite however, the approach does not stipulate 
that debts ever are refunded (Blanchard/Fischer 1989: 127); in that case, the long-run sustain-
ability condition is given by positive gap between the real interest rate and the economy's 
growth rate. FTPL nevertheless holds on to the overly strict condition [13]. Here, analogously 
to the one-equation approach of the Quantity Theory, the price level tP  is taken as the "final" 
endogenous variable, which suggests its determination through the other terms of the equa-
tion. A fiscal shock that increases the current budget deficit and the nominal stock of debt "re-
quires" higher prices today if the whole future surplus is unchanged.   
 Is this more than an "accounting gimmickry without substantive interest" (Christiano/ 
Fitzgerald 2000: 8)? Contrary to the Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic of Sargent and Wal-
lace (1981), FTPL at first does not assume that the central bank increases money supply and 
prices, aiming to make real public debt sustainable; also there is no expected monetisation. 
How then do the variables in [13] match? The equation "can be satisfied as long as P jumps 
[!?]. This is what FTPL advocates expect would happen. [...] The market [!?] will generate a 
value of P to guarantee debt is not excessive. [...] The market-clearing mechanism moves the 
price level, P, to restore equality" (Christiano/Fitzgerald 2000: 7, 3).  
Taking the price level as a jump variable (beyond an endowment model) contradicts em-
pirical findings and analytical traditions. But the key problem is to give an explanation of 
price increases. They do not simply reflect fiscal excess demand; rather, the idea seems to be 
that agents scale up prices because the alternative − an unchecked growth of real public debt 
                                                 
8 Equation [13] in the literature sometimes is also named the intertemporal budget constraint of 
government.    
13 
− is unconceivable and unwanted. But why should we see private agents repairing the gov-
ernment budget constraint by way of raising prices, thus depreciating their own money 
wealth, if they do not expect monetary impulses on the part of a central bank? It is hardly 
comprehensible to regard the price level as a risk-adjusting parameter of bond prices.9 It is 
more obvious that market agents try to sell these bonds so that equation [13] is met by a direct 
depreciation of tB . "The government's intertemporal budget constraint becomes a pricing 
kernel for the public debt, determining the effective value of the public debt and overriding its 
notional or contractual value" (Buiter 2002: 461, cf. Buiter 2017).  
On account of this muddle, a tolerable view on FTPL is that it builds implicitly on the as-
sumption of an institutional agent who precludes government bankruptcy (Bassetto 2008). 
The postulate of a constant nominal value of tB  in FTPL points to the role of the central 
bank. If nominal bond prices are fixed by monetary policy operations, the prediction of rising 
prices − in the case where fiscal authorities seem to live beyond their long-term budget con-
straints − is in line with standard macroeconomic wisdom. The monetarist transmission 
mechanism between money and prices will apply. Also, observing a mispricing of securities, 
asset holders will sell government bonds to the central bank and switch to other assets or even 
goods, which brings about excess demand. Hence, FTPL reduces to the simple recommenda-
tion of expansionary fiscal policy while offering a monetary backstop for government debt.  
 
V.  Is There a Puzzle of Missing Inflation? 
The preceding chapters argued that new "unconventional theories" hardly provide much hope 
in additional power of central banks. But is this hope necessary after all? Taking into account 
the deep structural distortions that have come with the US banking crisis and the ensuing euro 
crisis, it is good news to see inflation on the rise10 again in major western economies (Figure 
4). This finding is not quite in accordance with the often-articulated idea of flat supply curves 
in the world economy, which draw their shape from globalised trade, technical progress and 
weak wage-setting powers (which in turn depend on labour market deregulation and un-
employment on a world scale). These factors surely shaped supply-side conditions in recent 
                                                 
9 Also in the euro crisis, we did not witness rising price levels in countries that were hit by severe 
solvency shocks with respect to their government bonds.  
10 Figures are somewhat more subdued with regard to core inflation. However, the larger the eco-
nomic area under consideration, the more dubious is the core-inflation concept. Supply-shock events 
that appear to be exogenous from a small-country point of view turn out to be driven by the overall 
macroeconomic activity in the world economy.   
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years, but they do not indicate a fundamental farewell to the principle of scarcity in macro-
economics. 
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Figure 4: Growth rate of consumption price index  
(data source: OECD Economic Outlook, 102, November 2017, online) 
 
The intercept of the goods market supply function is no less important than its slope. It is 
mainly determined by inflation expectations, which among other factors depend on the central 
bank inflation target. Aiming at a rough assignment: the ability of monetary policy to control 
inflation determines the movement along the economy's supply function, whereas its intercept 
depend on the central bank's credibility and on market agents' belief in its power.11 There is 
some evidence of a decline in trend inflation, and inflation persistence seems to have in-
creased.  
Analytically, NK models often over-simplify matters by assuming rational expectations 
whereby trend inflation is identified with the central bank target. The model modification pre-
sented in [11] instead allowed for a hybrid mechanism of expectation formation. This setup 
can be further elaborated by establishing a variable size of agent groups that practice rational 
and adaptive expectations (the parameter θ  was fixed in the model above). It is an obvious 
idea to let agents choose their preferred mechanism of expectation formation according to 
their relative performance, i.e. their success to predict key macroeconomic variables. In this 
case, a protracted deviation from inflation target undermines its credibility, agents will shift to 
                                                 
11 "Shifts in the mean inflation rate expected in the long run indicate impaired trust in the central 
bank's commitment to achieve and maintain price stability. [...] By contrast, increased inflation persis-
tence may imply an erosion of the effectiveness of the central bank's policy in stabilising inflation" 
(Ciccarelli/Osbat 2017: 11). 
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adaptive expectations, which in turn aggravates the monetary policy task of boosting output 
and inflation. This poses a risk for the economy to get stuck in a low-inflation constellation 
(Busetti et al. 2017).  
Fortunately, in case of the eurozone, it seems that this risk has not materialised. Inflation-
ary expectations have recovered from their trough in 2015 and are heading now steadily to-
wards a 1.5 % level which is "below, but close to" the ECB target (Figure 5). The threat of 
de-anchoring has vanished (Ciccarelli/Osbat 2017), but there is also no sign of inflation ex-
pectations beyond that target rate which would be necessary to lend support to a successful 
FG strategy. Given this background, the persistent expansionary policy course of the ECB is 
hard to justify from a macroeconomic point of view. The Federal Reserve seems to be the 
only central bank, compared to the ECB, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, that has 
begun a normalisation of its policy stance (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 5: Market-based measures of inflation expectations (ECB Economic Bulletin, 6, 2017: 24) 
 
It is an open secret that the rationale of recent ECB policy is the support for public debt in 
southern eurozone countries. Keeping up and driving up asset prices also confirms that there 
is no puzzle of missing inflation in the eurozone. It is no contradiction to the Quantity Theory 
of Money that goods and asset prices rise in a variable proportion, differing from previous cy-
cles. Creating allocative distortions and dynamic instability on asset markets is too high a 
price for the attempt to realise some minor increases of goods market inflation.  
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Figure 6: Three-month interbank interest rates  
(data source: OECD Economic Outlook, 102, November 2017, online) 
 
 
VI.  Summary 
Some "unconventional theories" have been proposed in recent years that aim to shed new 
light on the ability of monetary policy to control the value of money, beyond the traditional 
approach of managing interest rates and/or monetary conditions. Three of them that were 
briefly presented in this contribution were assessed to be less convincing, on analytical as 
well as on empirical grounds.  
 FG aims at a modification of standard modern interest rate policy, namely to announce a 
temporary overshooting of inflation in the near future, relative to the official target, and a se-
quence of policy interest rates that conform to this goal. In case of a binding zero lower 
bound, which limits actual central bank actions, FG comprises to keep rates "lower for 
longer", i.e. the central bank promises not to respond to recovering inflation for some time pe-
riod. A major objection to FG is: if monetary policy obviously is unable to regain a macro-
economic equilibrium with inflation at the target value by employing its usual means, market 
agents will hardly believe that the central bank is able to reach an even higher rate.  
 The NF view turns traditional interest rate policy on its head and calls for higher, not 
lower rates. If the nominal interest rate immediately is raised to the Fisher Equation level cor-
responding to the inflation target, market agents − understanding that the economy will soon 
settle down in a long-term equilibrium − will adjust their inflation expectations, and this will 
help to bring actual inflation on track. However, one may doubt that individuals think in terms 
of analytical equilibrium conditions; at most they might have learnt that interest rates are 
17 
moved to counter any path of inflation. Therefore a NF policy experiment most probably will 
be counterproductive.  
 Also the FTPL seems to be on the wrong track. It states that the price level always 
"jumps" to a value that solves the intertemporal equilibrium condition of public finance, 
namely that the real value of discounted future budget surpluses "backs" any current budget 
deficit. The key objection here is that any doubt with respect to the sustainability of govern-
ment debt will impact on the market price of government bonds, and not (primarily) on the 
price level of goods.  
 At first sight, it is difficult to detect a common thread that links all three approaches. 
They build on assumptions that grow out of a mixture of model-consistent rational expecta-
tions − applied in a somewhat simple-minded way −, unfounded trust in policy announce-
ments, and long-term equilibrium conditions, spelled forward and/or backward looking, that 
markets agents are supposed to believe in. Most probably, macroeconomic relationships be-
tween markets and policies work in a more old-fashioned way (Krugman 2018).  
The "negative" results, which respect to the persuasiveness of these three approaches, are 
less relevant from a more practical point of view however. The data do not support the "puz-
zle of missing inflation". Interest rate policies and Quantitative Easing programs have led to 
rising prices. The overproportional rise of asset prices should pose a signal for normalisation 
of monetary policy, in order to avoid allocative distortions and financial instability.  
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06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO 
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
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HCM 
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK  
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Jochen Streb 
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10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele, 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO 
11-2010 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM 
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO 
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO 
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK 
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK 
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM 
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT 
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM 
19-2010 Frauke Lammers, 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM 
20-2010 Martyna Marczak, 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO 
21-2010 Harald Degner, 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK 
22-2010 Heiko Stüber, 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO 
23-2010 Mark Spoerer, 
Jochen Streb 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
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ECO 
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24-2011 
 
Dhammika 
Dharmapala,  
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO 
25-2011 Michael Schuele, 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
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26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
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27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
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ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
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30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
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IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
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33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
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35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
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A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
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INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
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1985–1998: A CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
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Andreas Pyka 
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PROJEKTES 
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Michael Ahlheim, 
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THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
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Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
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59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
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62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
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Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
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Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
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WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
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and Alfonso Sousa-
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HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
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Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
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74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
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RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
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Yin Krogmann, 
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INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
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76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
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Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
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THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
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Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
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TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
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Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
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THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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